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MAKING MISTAKES WITH MACHINES 
By Harsimar Dhanoa 
As adoption of machine-executed smart contracts increases, so 
too does the risk that the machines underlying these agreements will 
deviate from the intentions of the contracting parties. While contract 
law allows a narrow opportunity for setting aside of a contract under 
the doctrine of mistake, the application of this doctrine is muddied 
when the machines entirely operate within the confines of their 
programming. This paper highlights two notable instances of such 
deviation, the flash crash of 2010 and the 2016 attack on the 
blockchain project, the DAO, before focusing on the first case to 
address the doctrine of mistake in the context of these smart contracts: 
the Singaporean case of B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd. While the 
Singapore International Commercial Court and the Court of Appeal of 
Singapore, the country’s highest court, reached the correct solution, 
this paper argues that the Singaporean courts incorrectly limited 
themselves to only considering the knowledge and intentions of the 
programmer behind the smart contracts. Further, the paper suggests 
that a threshold inquiry offered by the American Restatement (2d) on 
Contracts may help to establish when a party using a smart contract 
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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of contract is fundamental to modern contract law. 
The principle balances on one hand, parties’ rights to bind themselves 
legally, even where the agreement “may not seem desirable or pleasant 
to outside observers,” whether they range from mowing a lawn for a 
paltry sum or enabling a multi-million-dollar merger.1 On the other 
hand, the principle requires parties to accept a possible bad bargain 
without court interference.2 However, to quote Alexander Pope, “to err 
is human.”3 While courts have not been so divine as to forgive such 
mistakes entirely, both English and American contract law allow for 
the rescission of some contracts under the doctrine of mistake. This 
doctrine traditionally has been narrow, reflecting both a concern that 
parties feeling disappointed in their deal may concoct mistakes after 
the fact and a recognition that the avoidance of mistakes is “precisely 
the quality which marks the successful and efficient businessmen.”4 
Thus, for courts whose “primary goal in interpreting contracts is to 
determine and enforce the parties’ intent,” when should mistake be 
accounted for and on what grounds?5 
While the task of remedying mistakes is complex among 
humans alone, the increasing role of machines in the formation and 
execution of contracts presents an additional wrinkle to resolve. 
Imagine the following scenario: Hunter, a computer programmer, turns 
to their spouse, Dakota, and says, “I’m heading to the store. Any 
requests?” Dakota responds “Pick up a loaf of bread. If they have eggs, 
pick up a dozen.” With Dakota’s instructions in tow, Hunter goes to the 
store and returns an hour later with thirteen loaves of bread in hand. 
Upon seeing the loaves, an exasperated Dakota asks, “Why’d you buy 
so much bread?” In response, Hunter simply says: “They had eggs.” 
While legal scholars may disagree on how Hunter should have 
interpreted Dakota’s ambiguous instructions, in the eyes of a machine 
(or at the least, a computer programmer thinking like a machine), the 
instructions are incredibly clear. Computers are exacting textualists 
that dutifully obey their instructions, even where those instructions 
 
1 Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999). 
2 Id., see also CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 113 (1981) ("If we take autonomy seriously as a 
principle for ordering human affairs . . . people must abide by the 
consequences of their choices . . ."). 
3 ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 30 (1711). 
4 P.B.H. BIRKS, THE ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 76–77 (2014). 
5 Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich.App. 57, 63 (2000). 
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deviate from the programmer’s intent.6 As a result, Hunter’s actions 
appear absurd in the context of a person interpreting Dakota’s 
instructions and yet perfectly reasonable in the context of a computer 
attempting to do the same. 
As “smart contracts” become increasingly more common, the 
significance of the disconnect between the ways that humans and 
machines understand language magnifies.7 In turn, courts, which are 
well versed in the application of contract doctrine to traditional 
contracts, will need to apply this doctrine in the context of these smart 
contracts.8 More specifically, courts will need to resolve the tension 
that exists when a computer’s execution of an agreement is in line with 
the objective programming of the smart contract, but not in line with 
the subjective intents of one of the parties to the contract. For example, 
if Dakota sought to reverse the purchase of the additional dozen loaves, 
how should a court reconcile the competing objective and subjective 
views of contract in the context of her smart contract? And if the court 
decides that Dakota is bound to the purchase of the additional loaves, 
what measures might ensure that future parties relying on smart 
contracts are mindful of the risks? 
This paper seeks to explore these questions in the context of 
B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd, a decision of first impression in which the 
Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) analyzed the 
doctrine of mistake in the context of an algorithmic trading contract on 
a cryptocurrency exchange, and its subsequent affirmation by 
Singapore’s highest court.9 These decisions provide the first 
opportunity to analyze how courts in practice assess the contours of the 
contract doctrine of mistake in light of smart contracts. In reviewing 
these decisions, this paper builds on previous work to explore the 
 
6 In fact, interpreting Dakota’s instructions literally, Hunter would have never 
returned home, having never been told to do so. Instead, they would have stood 
in the grocery store for eternity after having physically picked up the bread. 
7 While some scholars use the term “smart contract” to refer to agreements 
that utilize “blockchain” or distributed ledger technology, for the purposes of 
this paper, the term refers to a broader category of agreements whose 
formation and/or execution is automated, often “through a computer running 
code that has translated the [human language] legal prose into an executable 
program.” See MAX RASKIN, THE LAW AND LEGALITY OF SMART 
CONTRACTS, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 309 (2017). 
8 See, e.g., Mark Giancaspro, Is a 'Smart Contract' Really a Smart Idea? 
Insights from a Legal Perspective, 33 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 825, 835 
(2017) ("It is not yet entirely clear whether smart contracts are a smart idea, 
but there is little doubt the question will soon be tested in the courts."). 
9 See generally B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03, aff’d Quoine 
Pte Ltd v. B2C2 Ltd [2020] SGCA(I) 02. 
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disagreements between the SICC and Singapore’s highest court, and to 
suggest that a threshold inquiry imported from American contract law 
to identify when the doctrine of mistake should be available to parties 
using smart contracts and when they instead have undertaken the risk 
of that outcome. 
Part I provides a background to the rise of machine-executed 
smart contracts, using J.G. Allen’s model of the contract stack to 
provide a comparison to traditional contracts. Part I additionally 
highlights four applications of these agreements and subsequent 
instances where the machine’s execution diverged from the parties’ 
intentions. Part II begins with the factual background of the dispute 
between B2C2 Ltd. and Quoine and discusses the Singapore 
International Commercial Court’s application of the mistake doctrine 
as well as the subsequent decision to deny rescission, its affirmation by 
Singapore’s highest court and compares the application of American 
contract common law. Part III discusses the implications of the B2C2 
decision and whether the doctrine of mistake should treat machine-
executed contracts differently. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Rise of Machine-Executed Smart Contracts 
The interaction between the natural language used by humans 
and the formal language used by machines is not new. Rather, the use 
of machines to form and execute contracts goes back nearly half a 
century.10 However, as technology enables greater machine autonomy, 
computers increasingly operate not only as the mediums of 
communication for humans seeking to contract. Instead, these 
machines also act as active instruments in allowing parties to contract. 
As the technology develops further and becomes more sophisticated, 
computers may be able to act autonomously in forming contracts, 
requiring little to no human input as they negotiate complex terms 
beyond just price.11 Because of their analytical sophistication, smart 
 
10 Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems—automated digital 
communications between or within firms—have been around since the 1970s. 
While the scope of these systems goes beyond contracting electronic 
communication, they facilitate particular types of contracts, such as purchase 
orders. See generally JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, LAW OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE § 5-09 (4th ed. 2001). 
11 See generally Samir Chopra & Laurence White, Artificial Agents and the 
Contracting Problem: A Solution Via an Agency Analysis, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 363 (2009). While some scholars raise questions as to 
application of contract law to artificially intelligent machines that extend this 
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contracts can process a vast amount of data thanks to advances in data 
collection and storage.12 Moreover, advances in processing speed allow 
machines to achieve a level of sophistication that would otherwise be 
impractical for humans to perform given the time and effort required.13 
Scholar J.G. Allen’s model of the contract stack illustrates the 
parallels between traditional contracts and their “smart” equivalents.14 
The model utilizes the idea of a “software stack”—a set of software 
and hardware subsystems that are needed to implement a fully 
functional computing solution.15 In computing, a simplified solution 
stack consists of the application as well as the programming 
environment, data management layer, operating system, and hardware 
platform.16 With a “paper” contract, the contract is similarly comprised 
of multiple layers: “(i) the spoken words through which the contractual 
terms were negotiated and against which the text was drafted, (ii) the 
written text, and (iii) legal rules implying terms and governing 
construction.”17 Depending on the nature of the agreement, this second 
layer is often highly complex as the layer of legal rules generally 
excludes the consideration of “off-contract” materials, such as pre-
contract negotiations, with limited exception.18 In a smart contract, the 
written text codifying the parties’ intentions is complemented (or in 
some instances fully replaced) by machine-executable code.19 
Depending on the design and nature of the agreement, this code layer 
may cover some to all of the contract as a whole.20 This model 
highlights that modern smart contracts remain “wrapped” in a 
traditional contractual framework given the relationship between the 
contract’s written instruments and its digital ones.21 
 
active role to be able to independently contract absent any humans, such issues 
are beyond the scope of this paper. 
12 See Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. 
J. LAW & TECH. 309, 318–19 (2017). 
13 Id. at 318. 
14 See generally J.G. Allen, Wrapped and Stacked: “Smart Contracts” and the 
Interaction of Natural and Formal Language, 14 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 307 
(2018). 
15 Bettina Hein, 0+0=1: The Appliance Model of Selling Software Bundled 
with Hardware 17–18 (May 11, 2007) (unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author). 
16 Id. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of the elements of a traditional contract and those of a 
smart contract under J.G. Allen's contract stack theory. 
B. Breakdowns in the Contract Stack 
Two applications of smart contracts include high frequency 
trading, and distributed organizations. 
1. High Frequency Trading 
One widespread application of machine-executed smart 
contracts is their use in high frequency trading. While no one universal 
or legal definition of high frequency trading exists, the term generally 
refers to the trading of financial instruments, such as securities and 
derivatives through the use of supercomputers with the capability to 
execute trades within microseconds or milliseconds.22 High frequency 
trading thus works as a smart contract whereby the algorithmic code is 
used for “decision making, order initiation, generation, routing, or 
execution, for each individual transaction without human direction.”23 
By trading hundreds or thousands of times per day, traders that use high 
frequency trading are able to profit by aggregating small amounts of 
profit per trade, often in the magnitude of fractions of a cent.24 Over the 
past decade, the use of high frequency trading has grown significantly. 
Within the U.S., it accounts for approximately 55% of the equity 
market trading volume and about 40% in European equity markets.25 
 
22 RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORT, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV, R44443, HIGH 
FREQUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44443.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 2, 4 n.14. 
25 Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial 
Markets 1 (Jan. 21, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Economic and Risk 
Traditional Contract
The spoken words through 
which the contractual terms 
were negotiated and against 
which the text was drafted
The written text
Legal rules implying terms and 
governing construction
Smart Contract
The spoken words through 
which the contractual terms 
were negotiated and against 
which the text was drafted
Machine-executable code
The written text
Legal rules implying terms and 
governing construction
104 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
Algorithmic trading programs generally influence the trading decisions 
of as many as seventy percent of the securities transactions executed in 
the United States.26 
However, high frequency trading is not without its risks, as it 
can unintentionally contribute to market volatility in times of stress. 
The most notable example of this is the flash crash of 2010, during 
which the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by nine percent and 
millions of dollars were lost in the span of minutes.27 While the official 
report issued by the joint advisory committee, comprised of staff from 
both the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), investigating the crash 
did not explicitly attribute the crash to high frequency traders, it did 
find that the algorithm of a non-high frequency traded mutual fund sold 
nearly a tenth of its previous volume as a hedge against unusually high 
volatility in the market.28 The execution of the algorithmic sell contract 
resulted in the largest net change in daily position of any trader in the 
E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts market since the beginning of the 
year.29 While the high frequency traders initially absorbed the 
downward pressure caused by this sale, they eventually aggressively 
sold their contracts, increasing the rate at which the mutual fund sold 
its position.30 According to a report on the flash crash, “[a]s time 
passed, the aggressiveness only increased, with these violent selling 
events occurring more often, until finally the e-Mini circuit breaker 
kicked in and paused trading for 5 seconds, ending the market slide.”31 
While the flash crash occurred in a regulated securities market, 
not all high frequency trading occurs in such venues. Dark pools are 
alternative trading systems that permit the trading of securities listed 
on national securities exchanges as well as “off-exchange,” or unlisted 




26 See Michael Mackenzie, High-Frequency Trading Under Scrutiny, FIN. 
TIMES (July 28, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d5fa0660-7b95-11de-
9772-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3kPGSbBkJ. 
27 CTFC & SEC, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 
2010, 1–4 (Sept. 30, 2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf. 
28 Id. at 2. 
29 Id. 
30May 6’th 2010 Flash Crash Analysis, NANEX (Oct. 14, 2010), 
http://www.nanex.net/FlashCrashFinal/FlashCrashAnalysis_Theory.html. 
31 Id. 
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nationally regulated exchanges.32 As of April 2020, there are over fifty 
dark pools in operation.33 While the SEC’s Regulation ATS imposed 
some rules on these dark pools, the regulation lowers the standard of 
applicable regulation compared to national securities exchange if the 
alternative trading system complies with the Regulations reporting 
requirements.34 
Like with the initial hypothetical with Hunter and Dakota, the 
performance of the high frequency trading programs highlights how 
machines, while dutifully following their coding, can lead to disastrous 
results. While such issues may have never arisen if only one algorithm 
was in place, the features that make smart contracts used for high 
frequency trading—their speed and their analytical sophistication—
meant that their sensitivity to market forces created economic 
resonance that affected the market in ways that the traders behind the 
high frequency trading never intended. 
2. Decentralized Organizations 
Another application of smart contracts is the use of distributed 
ledger technology as a centralized platform to create decentralized 
organizations.35 One of the most prominent examples of such a 
decentralized organization is the DAO, a decentralized autonomous 
organization programmed by the German startup Slock.it.36 Having 
raised more than $160 million from more than 10,000 people globally, 
the DAO operated on the same technology that drives Bitcoin.37 
However, rather than operate as a cryptocurrency, the DAO’s purpose 
was to effectively be a venture capital firm that raises funds for projects 
run on the Ethereum blockchain—the leading blockchain-based 
platform for smart contracts—and then to disperse the funds based on 
 
32 Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency Trading in 
Dark Pools, 42 J. CORP. L. 833, 864 (2017). 
33 SEC, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS WITH FORM ATS ON FILE WITH 
THE SEC AS OF APRIL 30, 2020 (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/node/add/data_distribution/atslist043020.pdf. 
34 See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 245 (Dec. 11, 1998) (providing 
alternative trading systems with a choice in regulatory treatment as an 
exchange or as a broker-dealer). 
35 See generally, e.g., Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the DAO: The Need for 
Legal Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to Decentralized 
Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (2018). 
36 See id. at 1534; David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK 
(June 25, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-
journalists. 
37 Metjahic, supra note 35, at 1534. 
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its members’ votes.38 Ultimately, it contained roughly fifteen percent 
of all ether on the Ethereum network.39 Like with corporations that rely 
on a set of bylaws that guide how shareholders, employees, and the 
board of the directors interact with one another, the DAO relied on a 
set of smart contracts that encoded the bylaws of the organization.40 
However, despite its name, the DAO was not a true decentralized 
autonomous organization as it still depended on human involvement.41 
Unfortunately, the smart contracts that powered the DAO 
proved to be its undoing. Shortly after the DAO’s funding period 
closed, one of the DAO’s creators announced a vulnerability that was 
common to all Ethereum smart contracts, as well as a fix that was meant 
to prevent the vulnerability from being used to drain funds from the 
DAO.42 At the time, more than fifty project proposals were waiting to 
be voted on, but the blog post reiterated that “no DAO funds [were] at 
risk.”43 However, less than a week later, an attacker used the 
supposedly-fixed vulnerability in combination with the inherent 
functionality of the DAO’s smart contracts.44 First, the vulnerability 
allowed the attacker to send ether to the DAO’s smart contract, which 
triggered the smart contract to add the ether to its balance using an 
addToBalance function.45 Next, the hacker withdrew the same amount 
of currency, which first triggered the smart contract to disperse the 
 
38 See Nathaniel Popper, A Hacking of More Than $50 Million Dashes Hopes 




39 Siegel, supra note 36. 
40 See Obrea Poindexter & Temidayo O. Odusolu, Code-Based Fund - the 
Future of Startup Funding, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2016, 12:55 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/privateequity/articles/826986/code-based-fund-the-
future-of-startup-funding. 
41 See Metjahic, supra note 35, at 1544. 
42 Stephan Tual, No DAO Funds at Risk Following the Ethereum Smart 
Contract ‘Recursive Call’ Bug Discovery, SLOCK.IT BLOG (June 12, 2016), 
https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-funds-at-risk-following-the-ethereum-smart-
contract-recursive-call-bug-discovery-29f482d348b#.mbfqikiyo. 
43 See id.; Siegel, supra note 36. 
44 See Maria P. Gomez Gelvez, Explaining the DAO Exploit for Beginners in 
Solidity, MEDIUM (Oct. 16, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@MyPaoG/explaining-the-dao-exploit-for-beginners-in-
solidity-80ee84f0d470. For a more detailed discussion of the multi-stage 
attack, see generally Phil Daian, Analysis of the DAO Exploit, HACKING 
DISTRIBUTED (June 18, 2016), 
https://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/18/analysis-of-the-dao-exploit/. 
45 Gelvez, supra note 44.  
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ether using the withdrawBalance function before updating the smart 
contract’s balance.46 This order of operations, combined with the 
previously-discovered vulnerability, allowed the attacker to repeatedly 
request to withdraw the ether before the smart contract ever updated its 
balances.47 
In response, nearly ninety percent of individuals with voting 
rights voted to implement a hard fork in the DAO’s protocol. This hard 
fork split the Etherium network into two chains.48 On one chain, which 
kept the original Ethereum name, a new smart contract was created that 
would allow the initial investors to withdraw their initial investments.49 
On the other unforked version, entitled Ethereum Class, the attacker 
received the funds.50 The decision to implement a hard fork led to 
controversy as it required the violation of the immutability principle of 
the distributed ledger technology underlying the DAO.51 
Interestingly, the attacker also opined on whether a hard fork 
was appropriate after the attack, noting that they had “carefully 
examined the code of The DAO and decided to participate after finding 
the feature where splitting is rewarded with additional ether. I have 
made use of this feature and have rightfully claimed 3,641,694 ether, 
and would like to thank the DAO for this reward.”52 The attacker 
opposed the term “theft,” instead highlighting that their actions made 
use of explicitly coded features within the smart contract—code which 
was described as “control[ling] and sett[ing] forth all terms of the DAO 
Creation.”53 Thus, the attacker claimed that a soft or hard fork would 
amount to an unlawful seizure of the attacker’s “legitimate and rightful 
ether, claimed legally through the terms of a smart contract” and they 
reserved “all rights to take any and all legal action against any 
accomplices of illegitimate theft, freezing, or seizure of my legitimate 
ether.”54 However, nothing came of the attacker’s threats of legal 
action. 
The DAO highlights again the complicated relationship 




48 Ben Kaufman, The DAO Hack — Stolen $50M & The Hard Fork, MEDIUM: 





52 See generally An Open Letter, PASTEBIN (June 18, 2016), 
https://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. 
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itself and the expectations of the parties who contributed funds to the 
project. On one hand, the attack did not require rewriting or changing 
the terms of the initial DAO smart contract, but merely interacting with 
the existing code such that it produced the response that the attacker 
wanted. Conversely, however, the response the attacker wanted—
repeatedly withdrawing funds from the DAO’s coffers—was not 
within the realm of possibilities that they had intended to produce. If 
the attacker had followed through on his threat of legal action, one can 
only begin to imagine how a court would struggle to detangle these 
threads especially where, unlike in other smart contracts, the code of 
the DAO fully replaced any natural language agreements that would 
offer additional interpretative guidance. 
II. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN B2C2 AND QUOINE 
The threads of high frequency trading and the DAO converge 
in the dispute between B2C2 and Quoine. Quoine, a Singapore-
incorporated company, operated a currency exchange platform which 
allowed third parties to trade Bitcoin and Ethereum “for other virtual 
currencies or for fiat currencies such as Singapore or US dollars.”55 All 
traders entered into an agreement with the platform owner, Quoine, in 
order to trade on the platform.56 Quoine offered three types of trading 
on its platform: spot trading, where trades are settled instantly; margin 
trading, where traders can trade using borrowed funds; and futures 
trading, where the traders agree to sell at a future date at a given price.57 
For traders engaged in margin trading, the trader could source the 
borrowed funds from Quoine itself or from other users on the platform 
who offered their funds for peer-to-peer loans, with the assets in the 
margin trader’s accounts serving as collateral.58 If the collateral in the 
account fell below a pre-determined percentage of the loan, the 
platform would automatically make a margin call and would close out 
all or part of the margin trader’s position in an attempt to prevent 
further loss and ultimately a default.59 Additionally, Quoine operated 
as a market maker on its platform, using its “quoter program” to source 
prices from other exchanges, akin in some ways to high frequency 
trading.60 Similarly, B2C2 was an electronic market maker 
incorporated in England.61 While B2C2’s software normally evaluates 
 
55 B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 10 (Sing.). 
56 Id. at 10. 
57 Id. at 7. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 8. 
60 Id. at 5–6. 
61 B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 1. 
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the first twenty market prices and calculates an appropriate price to 
trade at, the software maintains a fail-safe price of 10 bitcoin to one 
ether when there is insufficient market data.62 
A. The April 19th Reversal 
On April 13, 2017, Quoine made changes to several login 
passwords made earlier in the week for security reasons, but did not 
make necessary changes to its quoter program.63 As a result, the quoter 
program was unable to access data from other exchanges and stopped 
creating new bitcoin/ether orders on the platform.64 Over the next few 
days, existing orders on the bitcoin/ether order book were matched with 
customer orders, leading to the eventual depletion of the platform’s 
order book.65 
On April 19th, two margin traders were trading in the 
Ethereum/Bitcoin market using ether borrowed from Quoine.66 Despite 
having insufficient bitcoin to maintain their position, the depletion of 
the bitcoin/ether order book led the platform, which had no separate 
program to check if a trader had sufficient available assets, to calculate 
that the margin traders’ positions were in a “margin sell-out position,” 
which served to trigger margin calls and the placement of orders to buy 
ether at the best available price on the platform.67 Within a half hour, 
the only remaining orders belonged to B2C2, priced at its fail-safe price 
of 10 bitcoin to 1 ether, even though this was 250 times the going rate 
of the previous existing orders.68 
The next day, Quoine became aware of the trades and 
“considered the exchange rate to be such a highly abnormal deviation 
from the previous going rate that the trades should be reversed.”69 As a 
result, Quoine cancelled B2C2’s trades and reversed the debit and 
credit transactions.70 Subsequently, B2C2 filed suit against Quoine, 
asserting that the unilateral cancellation of the trades constituted breach 
of contract of the agreement required of all traders seeking to trade on 
the platform.71 Quoine argued that it was entitled to reverse the trades 
 
62 Id. at 33–34. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 27. 
65 Id. at 28. 
66 Id. at 12. 
67 B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 28–29. 
68 See id. at 2, 32. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 53. 
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on the basis that its contracts with B2C2 were void under the doctrine 
of unilateral mistake at common law.72 
B. Applying Unilateral Mistake 
Under Singaporean law, to render a contract void under the 
common law doctrine of unilateral mistake, a party must show that it 
acted while operating under a mistake of a fundamental term of the 
contract and that the non-mistaken party had actual knowledge of the 
mistaken party’s error.73 Additionally, the doctrine of unilateral 
mistake in equity substitutes the non-mistaken party’s actual 
knowledge with constructive knowledge and also requires the mistaken 
party to show that the non-mistaken party  engaged in unconscionable 
conduct in relation to the mistake in order to establish that the contract 
is voidable.74 Because of the lack of any human intervention in the 
formation and execution of the contracts, the primary issue became 
whose knowledge was to be assessed as to the mistake, raising the 
following questions: “What mistakes have been made and to what 
extent are they fundamental? How does the Court assess knowledge or 
intention when the operation is carried out by computers acting as 
programmed? Whose knowledge is relevant? At what date is 
knowledge to be assessed?”75 
As a threshold matter, the SICC rejected Quoine’s argument 
that the court should approach these questions as if the parties had met 
on the “floor of the exchange” when executing the trades at issue.76 
Instead, the SICC noted that the parties chose intentionally to use 
computers as their means of trading and that in doing so, were aware 
that no human element was involved.77 The SICC concluded that the 
mistake must be a mistake by the person on whose behalf the computer 
placed the order, and that the mistake must be in existence on or prior 
to the time of the trades.78 
Quoine argued that B2C2 had actual or at least constructive 
knowledge of the margin traders’ mistaken belief that they were buying 
ether for bitcoin at prices which accurately represented or at least did 
not deviate significantly from the true market value because B2C2’s 
use of the fail-safe price of 10 bitcoin for 1 ether was set to allow it to 
unconscionably profit from potential errors of the other market 
 
72 Id. at 54. 
73 B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 77. 
74 Id. at 82, 83. 
75 Id. at 86. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 86–87. 
78 Id. 
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participants.79 While the SICC held that price was a fundamental term 
of the agreement, on appeal, Singapore’s highest court disagreed, 
instead characterizing the mistaken belief as a “mistaken assumption 
on the part of the Counterparties as to how the Platform would operate” 
because the prices of the disputed trades were determined by the 
parties’ respective algorithms.80 Thus, while the margin traders may 
have been mistaken in their assumptions about the circumstances under 
which the trades would be completed, the fundamental term at issue—
price—was not mistaken.81 
While the SICC and Singapore’s highest court disagreed as to 
whether the mistaken belief went to a fundamental term of the trades, 
they both agreed that B2C2 did not have actual or constructive 
knowledge of the margin traders’ mistaken belief.82 In attempting to 
address whose knowledge was central to the inquiry, the SICC adopted 
Quoine’s argument that it consider what the programmer of the 
software in question would have known and intended when writing the 
software.83 The court, attempting to limit its decision to the facts of the 
case, noted that while it did not intend to express any views on the legal 
relationship between computers and those who control or program 
them, the programs in the present case were entirely deterministic in 
that they “do and only do what they have been programmed to do,” 
akin to “a kitchen blender relieving a cook of the manual act of mixing 
ingredients.”84 Thus, the SICC held that when determining the 
intention or knowledge underlying a machine’s mode of operation, the 
court ought to turn to the operator or controller of the machine.85 In 
doing so, it inquired as to whether the programmer had actual 
knowledge that other traders believed that “in no circumstances would 
a trade be transacted on the Platform at prices which deviated 
substantially from the actual market prices . . . .”86 Finding that the 
programmer foresaw a number of factors which might cause the 
program to lack adequate pricing information and thus rely on the fail-
safe price, the court determined that his intention of including the fail-
safe price was because of his knowledge of the possibility of trades at 
 
79 B2C2 Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 91. 
80 Cf. id. at 84 (holding that price was a fundamental term of the agreement), 
with Quoine Pte Ltd. v. B2C2 Ltd., [2020] SGCA(I) 02 at 39 (Sing.) (holding 
that the mistaken belief at issue was a mistaken assumption as to how the 
platform would operate). 
81 Quoine Pte Ltd. v. B2C2 Ltd., [2020] SGCA(I) 02 at 56–57 (Sing.). 
82 Id. at 60–62. 
83 B2C2 Ltd. v. Quoine Pte Ltd., [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 89 (Sing.). 
84 Id. at 88–89. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 99. 
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that price being executed.87 Because the programmer did not have this 
actual knowledge, the SICC extrapolated and held that he could not 
have had actual knowledge that other traders on the platform had this 
belief.88 Accordingly, the SICC rejected Quoine’s unilateral mistake at 
common law defense.89 
With regard to its unilateral mistake in equity defense, the 
SICC held that the programmer did not “turn a blind eye to that which 
would have been obvious to everyone else in his position,” especially 
given his rationale and motivation for inserting the fail-safe price.90 
Further, the SICC noted that there was no unconscionability in the 
programmer’s actions, and that while they may have been an 
“opportunistic” business position to ensure that what would otherwise 
be an unlikely event was not necessarily an unlikely loss, it was not 
sinister.91 Thus, the SICC similarly rejected Quoine’s unilateral 
mistake in equity defense.92 
C. Evaluating the B2C2 Decision 
While it is not surprising that what appears to be the first case 
of the doctrine of mistake in the context of a smart contracts would 
emerge from Singapore, a jurisdiction with a reputation for embracing 
new technologies,93 the question remains: did Singapore reach the right 
decision? While the court reached the correct result, it incorrectly 
limited its inquiry to the knowledge and intentions of the programmer, 
the overall outcome is consistent with American contract law. 
The SICC’s tailoring of its inquiry to solely focus on the 
knowledge and motivations of the programmer behind B2C2’s price 
algorithm is concerning in its exclusion of the knowledge and 
motivation of B2C2 itself.94 In reaching the decision to inquire into the 
programmer’s state of mind, the SICC concedes that “[t]he knowledge 
or intention cannot be that of the person who turns it on, it must be that 
of the person who was responsible for causing it to work in the way it 
 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 99. 
89 Quoine Pte Ltd., [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 101. 
90 Id. at 100. 
91 Id. at 101. 
92 Id. 
93 See Lee U-Wen, Singapore a ‘Global Leader’ in Embracing Technology: 
Deloitte, SGSME (May 17, 2017, 5:50 AM), 
https://www.sgsme.sg/news/singapore-global-leader-embracing-technology-
deloitte. 
94 The issue here is slightly muddled as the programmer is also a B2C2 
director. 
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did.”95 However, in applying this principle, the SICC incorrectly limits 
itself only to the programmer. Read narrowly as the Singapore courts 
did, this limitation does not necessarily comply with the reality of the 
relationship between the programmer and the contracting party and 
where it does, it near entirely forecloses the possibility of successfully 
applying the doctrine of unilateral mistake. 
First, this narrow reading assumes the relationship between the 
programmer and the contracting party is entirely separate, when the 
development of the algorithm is a byproduct of communication 
between both parties. An issue with the formal language instrument 
within a smart contract “stack” is the challenge in ensuring consistency 
between the formal language used by a programmer within the 
instrument and the natural language understandings of what that formal 
language is meant to accomplish.96 In the context of programmers 
acting on behalf of a separate party, these natural language 
understandings are not those of the programmers themselves, but rather 
the separate party on whose behalf they are creating the program.97 This 
relationship mirrors the relationship between conventional transaction 
lawyers and the parties on whose behalf they draft traditional human 
language contract instruments. Similarly limiting the inquiry to the 
knowledge and intentions of the lawyer who drafted instruments rather 
than inquiring into the intentions of the contracting client would 
produce absurd results. In both circumstances, the approach appears to 
frustrate the court’s pursuit of determining and enforcing the parties’ 
intent by excluding a party from the inquiry. Thus, while a 
deterministic program may be limited to “only do what the programmer 
has programmed it to do,”98 the relevant inquiry must also include what 
the programmer was told by the contracting party to do. 
Further, even if no relationship exists between the contracting 
party and the programming, the sole consideration of the programmer’s 
knowledge and motivations would foreclose near any possibility of 
successfully applying the doctrine of unilateral mistake. Such a 
relationship may arise in instances where an “off the rack” smart 
 
95 Quoine Pte Ltd., [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 89. 
96 See Allen, supra note 14, at 336 (“Essentially, the challenge is to ensure that 
the terms written as down in the formal language by a programmer are 
isomorphic with the natural language understandings on which it is based. 
This is difficult because of the way that natural and formal languages work. It 
is not possible at the present time, in my view, and may never be fully possible. 
Even should we design systems which generate a natural and a formal 
language version simultaneously, it is impossible to say that their semantic 
content will be identical in all possible future states of the contract.”). 
97 See id. at 329. 
98 Quoine Pte Ltd., [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 88. 
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contract solution is developed from consumer use. In such instances, 
the programmer may never have any sense of another party’s mistaken 
belief, let alone actual knowledge of them. Mistaken parties, however, 
may be able to find some relief in the form of unilateral mistake in 
equity. Under that approach, a court could theoretically find that a 
remote programmer had constructive knowledge that their program 
would be used to capitalize on a generalized party’s mistaken belief, 
and if the non-mistaken party’s conduct was unconscionable, the 
contract is voidable in equity. However, such an approach is narrower 
than the traditional alternative under common law and may not produce 
consistent results as it might under law.99 Further, it does not address 
the effective elimination of the common law defense in such situations. 
Instead, even where no prior relationship exists between the 
programmer and the non-mistaken party, the courts should inquire into 
the contracting party’s state of knowledge. Such an approach would 
allow the doctrine of unilateral mistake to attach in situations where a 
program operated as it was programmed to but at the hands of a 
contracting party who sought to use it to take advantage of the other 
party’s mistaken belief. 
While Singapore’s highest court noted that the contracting 
parties at issue and Quoine did not know that the specific trading 
contracts would be entered into or what specific terms they would 
contain,100 the court takes for granted that contracting parties 
manifested their willingness to contract when they entered into 
agreements with Quoine to trade on the platform. More specifically, 
the court ignores the parties’ involvement in the choice of using the 
specific algorithm. In the present case, the proprietary nature of the 
algorithms collapses the inquiry because the programmer’s knowledge 
mirrored that of B2C2 generally. However, had B2C2 used a generally 
available algorithm rather than a bespoke one, a court limiting itself 
only to the consideration of the programmer’s knowledge would omit 
any consideration of why B2C2 chose that program over another, even 
if that choice was to use it to take advantage of another party’s mistaken 
belief. 
 
99 While unilateral mistake in common law requires actual knowledge, 
unilateral mistake in equity requires both constructive knowledge and “an 
additional element of impropriety” based on “the presence of other facts which 
could invoke the conscience of the court.” Id. at 83. Thus, while equity’s 
“flexibility to achieve the ends of justice” may serve as an advantage, the use 
of these more flexible standards could affect the consistency and predictability 
of the applicability of this doctrine depending on the judges hearing the case. 
See id at 82. 
100 Quoine Pte Ltd. v. B2C2 Ltd., [2020] SGCA(I) 02 at 46 (Sing.). 
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III. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS THROUGH A THRESHOLD 
INQUIRY 
The inclusion of a threshold inquiry mirroring § 154 of the 
Restatement (Second) on Contracts may improve the application of the 
doctrine of unilateral mistake. Section 153 of the Restatement lays out 
the requirements for the American doctrine of unilateral mistake: 
Where a mistake of one party at the 
time a contract was made as to a basic 
assumption on which he made the 
contract has a material effect on the 
agreed exchange of performances that 
is adverse to him, the contract is 
voidable by him if he does not bear 
the risk of the mistake under the rule 
stated in § 154, and 
(a) the effect of the mistake is such 
that enforcement of the contract 
would be unconscionable, or 
(b) the other party had reason to know 
of the mistake or his fault caused the 
mistake.101 
This doctrine mostly mirrors the Singaporean approach (which in turn 
mirrors the approach under English contract law) in its requirement that 
the mistaken party’s belief is a fundamental component of the 
contract.102 Notably, however, the American approach limits the 
doctrine to situations where the mistaken party has not assumed the risk 
of the mistake. Section 154 clarifies when these situations exist: 
A party bears the risk of a mistake 
when 
(a) the risk is allocated to him by 
agreement of the parties, or 
(b) he is aware, at the time the 
contract is made, that he has only 
limited knowledge with respect to the 
facts to which the mistake relates but 
 
101 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
102 See B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] SGHC(I) 03 at 83 (Sing.). 
116 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 37 
treats his limited knowledge as 
sufficient, or 
(c) the risk is allocated to him by the 
court on the ground that it is 
reasonable in the circumstances to do 
so.103 
Comment A reiterates the general commitment to freedom of contract 
underlying contract law and notes that the limitation serves to maintain 
contracting parties’ risk allocation, even when a change in 
circumstance “upset basic assumptions and unexpectedly affect the 
agreed exchange of performances.”104 
This threshold inquiry, however, requires some tailoring for 
the context of machine-executed smart contracts. First, when assessing 
allocation by agreement, courts should either not rely solely on the 
digital instrument within the contract “stack” as the explicit assertion 
of the agreement of the parties or should not rely on this prong 
altogether. If they were to do otherwise, a non-mistaken party would 
be able to submit the digital instrument’s execution as evidence of a 
non-ambiguous agreement that allocates the risk to the mistaken party, 
as was the case with the individual who was behind the 2016 DAO 
attack.105 In the case of Hunter and Dakota, out of fear that the formal 
language used to encode their instructions may be used against them, 
such an approach may encourage parties like Dakota to spend their 
digital instruments from the specter of any undesirable outcome, 
however improbable. In the worst case, parties may avoid using smart 
contracts altogether unless they can accomplish the nigh-impossible 
task of accounting for every possible outcome. Thus, while this prong 
may be easiest to administer, its adoption may be an overcorrection. 
Instead, the threshold inquiry should focus on the second and 
third prongs. As to the second prong, focusing on scenarios in which 
the mistaken party has consciously ignored their limited knowledge 
allows the court to separate cases where the deviation between a party’s 
intentions and a smart contract’s execution warrants consideration 
under the doctrine of unilateral mistake from those that do not. In the 
case of B2C2 and Quoine, such a prong would clearly highlight that 
Quoine assumed the risk of such trades.106 
The Singapore International Commercial Court’s ruling 
identified, among others, five “errors or omissions” that would have 
 
103 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
104 Id. cmt. a. 
105 Cf. An Open Letter, supra note 52.  
106 See Quoine Pte Ltd., [2019] SGHC(I) 03. 
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limited Quoine’s liability and would have demonstrated that it did not 
intend to allocate the risk to itself.107 First, it failed “to incorporate an 
exception message in its quoter program to alert Quoine to the fact that 
it was not working.”108 Second, it failed “to incorporate a circuit 
breaker in the Platform’s software to prevent trades when the order 
book was empty.”109 Third, it failed “to incorporate a circuit breaker to 
prevent orders at an abnormal price from being placed on the order 
book.”110 Fourth, it failed “to ensure that, in the case of a force-closure, 
the forced sales were only within a given price range.”111 And last, it 
failed “to ensure that, in the case of a force-closure, only assets which 
were actually held by a counterparty in its account at the time were the 
subject of a market order.”112 The cumulative omission of these various 
mechanisms that would otherwise have limited Quoine’s liability could 
thus support the claim that in consciously failing to include them, 
Quoine assumed the risk that the algorithm underlying its smart 
contract would behave outside of its expectations. 
For similar reasons as with the first prong, courts should not 
implement this prong so as to require, explicitly or implicitly, that 
parties wishing to use smart contracts to implement mechanisms to 
address every possible outcome, lest they be accused of consciously 
ignoring it. Instead, however, it could be used to import a reasonable 
standard of precaution based on prevailing risk-limitation practices, 
such as redundant sources of information and circuit breakers. Such an 
interpretation would highlight for parties that the choice to forego any 
mechanisms to cabin in the behavior of their smart contracts are liable 
for their contracts’ execution, even when they deviate from the parties’ 
expectations. In other words, parties would be on notice that if they 
plan to use smart contracts to “move fast,” they’re responsible for the 
things they “break” along the way. While this interpretation would not 
resolve all issues of risk allocation, it would however encourage parties 
to focus on ensuring that the risk mitigation mechanisms they impose 
are appropriately tailored. 
Last, the third prong would provide courts with a mechanism 
by which to assign the risk to a party when the other factors are not 
illustrative. Comment D to § 154 provides that when using this prong, 
the court “will consider the purposes of the parties and will have 
recourse to its own general knowledge of human behavior in bargain 
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transactions, as it will in the analogous situation in which it is asked to 
supply a term . . . .”113 In this way, the third prong allows courts to 
allocate the risk to a party where it is reasonable to do so for reasons 
outside of the first two prongs.114 For example, where a smart contract’s 
terms are silent as to which party bears the risk, and neither party 
consciously ignored the risks within the agreement, the court can then 
apply its collective experience with traditional contract to the general 
circumstances of the case. While this approach does not delineate 
specific factors the court should look at in applying this prong, applying 
this prong only as a last resort limits the risk of uncertain application 
while affording courts flexibility where they need it. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the centrality of freedom of contract to modern 
contract law, courts have grappled with the task of when to curb this 
principle and instead allow a party to claim that a mistake occurred. As 
smart contracts proliferate, however, so too does the risk that 
discrepancies will arise between what a party intends and the result 
produced by the machine-executable code underlying the contract. In 
turn, as these parties claim the doctrine of mistake, courts must assess 
where these discrepancies fit within traditional contract law. In the first 
decision of its kind, the Singapore International Commercial Court and 
the Court of Appeal of Singapore addressed this issue directly, and 
while they reached the correct result, their self-imposed limitation of 
considering only the knowledge and intentions of the programmer 
behind the smart contracts goes beyond what is necessary. Further, a 
threshold inquiry, offered by American contract law, may help to more 
easily disambiguate circumstances in which a party using a smart 
contract has assumed the risks associated with its execution, and when 
a party has truly made mistakes with machines. 
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